[SystemSafety] Automobile Safety-Critical Kit

From: Peter Bernard Ladkin < >
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 08:40:34 +0100


Rod Chapman just asked if I had seen this: http://www.edn.com/design/automotive/4423428/1/Toyota-s-killer-firmware--Bad-design-and-its-consequences?utm_source=High+Integrity+Systems+Newsletter&utm_campaign=20f7064d12-Toyota_ruling10_29_2013&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_02ca0b18f2-20f7064d12-415490749

It seems to be pretty significant.

To me it is quite believable that code which does not have to be assessed by/for any regulator can be as poorly designed as this code is asserted in this article to be. It looks as if what is reported is a mix of Dependability1 and Dependability2 problems.

(Please notice that I am not making any statements about the actual code, which I have neither inspected nor indeed seen, but about the statements made in this article. I haven't read the court judgement or records, either.)

PBL Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Faculty of Technology, University of Bielefeld, 33594 Bielefeld, Germany Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319 www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de

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systemsafety_at_xxxxxx Received on Thu Oct 31 2013 - 08:40:44 CET

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