[SystemSafety] Fwd: Measurement + Control

RICQUE Bertrand (SAGEM DEFENSE SECURITE) bertrand.ricque at sagem.com
Mon Dec 16 10:09:24 CET 2013


Beware that this depends highly on the different industrial sectors and their own culture. There is a huge gap between aeronautics (with inspectors embedded in the manufacturers offices) and general industry with proprietary information even not accessible to regulators !


Bertrand Ricque
Program Manager
Optronics and Defence Division
Sights Program
Mob : +33 6 87 47 84 64
Tel : +33 1 59 11 96 82
Bertrand.ricque at sagem.com



From: Andrew Rae [mailto:andrew.rae at york.ac.uk]
Sent: Monday, December 16, 2013 9:59 AM
To: RICQUE Bertrand (SAGEM DEFENSE SECURITE)
Cc: Peter Bernard Ladkin; systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Fwd: Measurement + Control


In my experience the commercial chain for third party review  is often indirect enough (e.g. via a safety manager) that there is incentive to find problems just to show you are on the ball and value for money.

On Peter's point: I know of one organisation who confused independent review with independent safety analysis, and were therefore proud that the original design safety analysis had nothing to do with the people who produced the system (and therefore had no possibility of making the system safer in the process).
On 16 Dec 2013 08:51, "RICQUE Bertrand (SAGEM DEFENSE SECURITE)" <bertrand.ricque at sagem.com<mailto:bertrand.ricque at sagem.com>> wrote:
Nobody pays (understand outsource) to get results in contradiction with one interests. Commercial third party review has always a genetic bias. Only independently funded third party can be expected to have the ad-hoc independence. But however, as PBL writes, who cares about them ? ILAC  ?


Bertrand Ricque
Program Manager
Optronics and Defence Division
Sights Program
Mob : +33 6 87 47 84 64<tel:%2B33%206%2087%2047%2084%2064>
Tel : +33 1 59 11 96 82<tel:%2B33%201%2059%2011%2096%2082>
Bertrand.ricque at sagem.com<mailto:Bertrand.ricque at sagem.com>




-----Original Message-----
From: systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de<mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de> [mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de<mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>] On Behalf Of Peter Bernard Ladkin
Sent: Monday, December 16, 2013 9:39 AM
To: systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de<mailto:systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Fwd: Measurement + Control

I lost the thread somewhat.

Let me first extend Nancy's statement of goal. Safety engineering is about designing, implementing, operating, maintaining and decommissioning appropriately safe systems appropriately safely.

Operating and maintaining appropriately safe systems used to take vigilance as well as some depth of understanding and experience. In many cases it still does. That's why we have driver's tests and licences, and why driving is a privilege not a right and may be rescinded.

Operations. Commercial flights inbound to an airport were - still are - given the visual one-over from the tower to make sure everything "looks right". Which usually has something to do with noting that the gear is down. It has been a long time, I think, since a commercial flight landed at a tower airport with gear up inadvertently (I am not speaking of gear malfunction). It used to be the case that we could not "design in" gear-operating systems for final approach. Now we probably can, although much is still up to trusting the operators (to follow procedure, including going around when the warning systems trigger or the tower says so). Seems to have worked.

Maintenance. Anyone remember Air Transat's Azores glider a month before 9/11? Maintenance required to change a fuel-supply joint some time before; maintenance staff couldn't find the precise maintenance manual on-line (it was a Sunday and not everyone was available to fix IT glitches); took a joint off the shelf for that engine type and installed it. Trouble is, it was the slightly wrong joint for that serial number; it chafed through from vibration in about fifty hours of operation, and led to the mid-Atlantic fuel leak. All the procedures were there; all the right documentation and knowledge was there and written down; it just wasn't quite available at the right time and place.

Decommissioning. Sellafield is the world's largest toxic waste dump and still no one has any real idea how to handle all that spent fuel from the last almost 60 years.

Safe operation, maintenance and decommissioning of many safety-critical systems still requires a lot of hands and brains. A point about Buncefield and outsourcing is that, even under the circumstances that your safety analysis is so complete that it specifies the precise operation of the safety function of overfill protection under precise conditions, then in order to maintain the system you still need people around (*) who know about and refer to that analysis, (**) who understand what it entails, and (***) who realise that the new kit doesn't do what the old kit did the way the system requires it. Otherwise a maintainer is maybe going to install the "newer, better" but still "equivalent" kit, and an inspector/supervising engineer is going to sign off on it, without anyone realising they have violated an essential constraint. As seems to have happened.

I won't rehearse the arguments that say that "outsourcing" any one of the operation, maintenance and oversight functions lead to an increased chance that one to all of (*), (**) and (***) are not going to be fulfilled. But I think that was the original point.

The same issue arises for any activity. I took Andrew's point to be that (*) and (**) suffer an increased chance of not being fulfilled when the safety case or review is "outsourced".

I think the way to address these issues is to ensure explicitly that (*), (**) and (***) are appropriately fulfilled for any of the activities involved in designing, implementing, maintaining or decommissioning a safety-critical system. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes still applies.

I bet, though, that the "outsourcing" contract said something like that (the operator's insurance company may well have insisted on it). Quis custodiet?

I think it cuts both ways. When you "outsource" review it is known as "independent safety review"
and thought to be a good thing. When you perform a HazOp for a process plant, the HazOp chair and Secretary are required to be from outside, that is, the leadership of the HazOp is "outsourced". And if the owner of a process plant doesn't have any other plants, it surely makes some sense to "outsource" maintenance and operations to an entity which maintains and operates many such plants and which has the relevant experience.

PBL

Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Faculty of Technology, University of Bielefeld, 33594 Bielefeld, Germany
Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319<tel:%2B49%20%280%29521%20880%207319>  www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de<http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de>




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