[SystemSafety] Lac-Megantic disaster

peter.sheppard at uk.transport.bombardier.com peter.sheppard at uk.transport.bombardier.com
Thu Jul 11 18:20:01 CEST 2013


Railway wagons normally have two brake lines, main line and train line. 
Each wagon has a local reservoir and brakes are applied through a triple 
valve and work through a difference in pressure between the main line and 
the train line.  (Pressure from the local reservoir is fed through the 
triple valve to the brake cylinders). So the essential issue is that the 
reservoir needs pressure in it for the brakes to be applied. 

All brake systems leak, so you need an engine attached to maintain the air 
pressure (or vacuum) - it makes no difference on the system in use.

If that engine stops (which apparently it did) the air leaks off and 
whilst the brakes will initially be applied, they will eventually leak off 
as all the pressure dissipates.

That is why all wagons either have handbrakes or spring applied parking 
brakes. 

It appears  (from what I have read) that one locomotive was left running, 
but that was shut down when the fire brigade attended. Locomotive hand 
brakes were applied, but they are designed to hold a locomotive, not a 70 
wagon train on a 1.2% gradient and it rolled!

Regards

Peter

Peter Sheppard
Senior Safety Engineer and Validator

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Rolf Spiker <rolf.spiker at exida.com>
Sent by: systemsafety-bounces at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
11/07/2013 17:11

To
Matt Squair <mattsquair at gmail.com>, Bielefield Safety List 
<systemsafety at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>
cc

Subject
Re: [SystemSafety] Lac-Megantic disaster







Hi Matt,
 
Your answer is a little puzzling to me
 
Your first two paragraphs:
Train brakes rely on pressure in what's called the brake pipe to keep them 
'off'. When brake pipe pressure falls below a set value the brakes engage. 
This is the Westinghouse system of air brakes basically. 
 
That gives you a fail safe train brake that will actuate in the event that 
the train inadvertently parts, in freight operations a not insignificant 
risk due to excessive inter-train dynamic forces. 
 
Are clearly my mentioned : With no any power (in this case vacuum), all 
brakes are fully engaged. 
 
The following paragraphs are discussing the opposite I think
You need power to get the brakes engaged.
Is that right?
 
Regards
                Rolf Spiker
Rolf Spiker of Exida.com
Senior Safety Consultant & Partner
Phone : +31 (0)318 414 505 
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From: Matt Squair [mailto:mattsquair at gmail.com] 
Sent: Thursday, July 11, 2013 11:48 AM
To: Rolf Spiker; Bielefield Safety List
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Lac-Megantic disaster
 
Train brakes rely on pressure in what's called the brake pipe to keep them 
'off'. When brake pipe pressure falls below a set value the brakes engage. 
This is the Westinghouse system of air brakes basically. 
 
That gives you a fail safe train brake that will actuate in the event that 
the train inadvertently parts, in freight operations a not insignificant 
risk due to excessive inter-train dynamic forces. 
 
However the brake actuation force is also normally provided by a pneumatic 
reservoir on each car, these are kept topped up by what's called the main 
reservoir pipe. Which is pressurized from air reservoirs located on the 
locomotives in the train, which are in turn pressurized by locomotive air 
compressors.
 
Like all pneumatic systems there's a certain amount of leakage, so, if the 
locomotive doesn't keep the main reservoir topped up with its air 
compressor the pressure will slowly bleed off and the train brake will 
disengage. 
 
Which is kind of why mechanical spring style park brakes are always used 
to park, and why the comments in the media that the loco was running to 
keep the brakes on is misleading. 
 
The actual reason has to do with operational efficiency as it takes time 
to pump up a trains reservoirs from ambient. Leave one loco on to run its 
air compressor and you can get away quickly in the morning.
 
Of course if all the needed park brakes aren't applied and then for some 
reason the online loco is shutdown...
 
As a side note, an increasing number of locomotives have what's called an 
Auto Engine Start Stop function to save fuel. With AESS the locomotives 
control system will monitor air reservoir pressure and only start the main 
engine if needed to run the air compressor. Modern freight trains are 
quite sophisticated and complicated systems. 
 
So one should be careful of believing what's being said about the 'cause' 
of the shutdown, just yet.
 
Hope that helps. :)
-- 
Matt Squair
Sent with Sparrow
 
On Thursday, 11 July 2013 at 7:09 PM, Rolf Spiker wrote:
I always thought that the brakes of a train (also for trucks) have to be 
energized to makes them free.
(Vacuum driven energizing)
c
 
Regards
                Rolf Spiker
Rolf Spiker of Exida.com
Senior Safety Consultant & Partner
Phone : +31 (0)318 414 505 
Mobile: +31 (0)6 116 225 52   
E Mail: rolf.spiker at exida.com
Mail address: 
Exida.com
Att: R.Th.E. Spiker
Nassaulaan 41
6721DX  Bennekom
The Netherlands

Established Company address:
64 N. Main Street
Sellersville, PA 18960
USA
<image005.jpg>
To view our Equipment database with certified elements go to:  
www.sael-online.com
<image006.png>


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From: systemsafety-bounces at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de [
mailto:systemsafety-bounces at techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf Of Peter 
Bernard Ladkin
Sent: Thursday, July 11, 2013 7:17 AM
To: Matthew Squair
Cc: Bielefield Safety List
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Lac-Megantic disaster
 
There are a lot of questions. The BBC is saying that the locomotive was 
left running as the train was parked 7 miles up the line, to power braking 
systems; that fire services powered down the locomotive in the course of 
extinguishing a small fire; that the train started moving downhill shortly 
after that:
 
[begin BBC quote]
 
The train, carrying 72 cars of crude oil, was parked shortly before 
midnight on Friday in the town of Nantes about seven miles (11km) away.
Local firefighters were later called to put out a fire on the train.
While tackling that blaze, they shut down a locomotive that had apparently 
been left running to keep the brakes engaged.
Shortly afterwards the train began moving downhill in an 18-minute 
journey, gathering speed until it derailed in Lac-Megantic and exploded.
[end BBC quote]
 
Questions.
1 (HaroldThimbleby) Powered braking systems on freight are often 
air-powered. But they are fail-safe - losing power means they engage. So 
what system here requires power to remain engaged?
2. Fire services called to a plant usually have an operator's emergency 
number to contact about plant details, and the operation of unattended 
running equipment. Is there no such system for freight trains? Why not?
3. That an engine attached to a train with HazMat on board could be left 
running and unattended. 4. How the railroad company could tell at this 
stage whether and how many handbrakes were or were not applied.

BTW, this is another accident situation predicted explicitly by 
sociologists Perrow and Clarke ( The Next Catastrophe, Princeton U.P., 
2007, resp. Worst Cases, U. Chicago Press 2005), as with flooding Mark 1 
BWRs. But they were more concerned with Hazmats such as chlorine and 
hydrogen fluoride than oil.

It should give engineers pause that sociologists are better at identifying 
hazards than they are. (Except for computer networks, of course, where I 
think Bellovin's 1992 paper on possible TCP/IP exploits takes some beating 
for prediction.)

PBL

Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, University of Bielefeld and Causalis Limited

On 11 Jul 2013, at 00:26, Harold Thimbleby ....... wrote:
<a comment about air brakes>
 
.... BBC News iPad App .......
 
Engineer blamed for Canada blast
 
A rail operator's chief executive blames a local engineer for a runaway 
train that derailed and exploded in a Quebec town, killing at least 15.
 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23264397

Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, University of Bielefeld and Causalis Limited

On 11 Jul 2013, at 04:03, Matthew Squair <mattsquair at gmail.com> wrote:
Bigger picture is that there's been a modal shift of oil transport to rail 
due to restrictions on pipeline construction, which drives a greater 
operational tempo in rail movements in turn.
 
On Thu, Jul 11, 2013 at 6:44 AM, Gergely Buday <gbuday at gmail.com> wrote:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23264397

Rail World boss Ed Burkhardt: "It is very questionable whether the hand 
brakes were properly applied. In fact I'll say they weren't". [...]

"He said he applied 11 hand brakes. We think that's not true. Initially we 
believed him but now we don't." [...]

The fire department and the train's owners have appeared in recent days to 
point the finger at one another over the disaster.
- Gergely

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-- 
Matthew Squair
 
Mob: +61 488770655
Email: MattSquair at gmail.com
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