[SystemSafety] Spanish train crash

Mon Jul 29 17:57:58 CEST 2013

Chris,

That was the point I was making, even following the application of 
"technology" to Morpeth Curve (albeit a fairly crude AWS warning), there 
were still derailments.

At Southall AWS and ATP were both fitted, but turned off at the time of 
the accident.

At Ladbroke Grove, the train that passed the red signal had not been 
fitted with ATP, but the HST approaching had (albeit having passed any 
measures that may have applied the brakes).

At Wembley there was a accident with a suburban unit running into the rear 
of a freightliner train as a result of repetitive cancelling on the AWS 
(AWS only discriminates between green and "not green")

Regardless of technology, it is the human and degraded modes that must be 
considered in all system designs.

Cheers

Peter
(Speaking for himself)

Peter Sheppard
Senior Safety Engineer and Validator

Mobile: +44 7920 247931

Please consider the environment before you print / Merci de penser à 
l'environnement avant d'imprimer / Bitte denken Sie an die Umwelt bevor 
Sie drucken 

Bombardier Transportation UK Ltd 
Registered Office: Litchurch Lane, Derby, DE24 8AD, England 
TEL +44 1332 344666, FAX +44 1332 266271 
Registered in England 
Registration No. 2235994 

"Chris Dale" <chris.dale at scsc.org.uk>
Sent by: systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
29/07/2013 16:38

To
<systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de>
cc

Subject
Re: [SystemSafety] Spanish train crash

Thank you, Peter.

Surely the lesson of the Morpeth derailments is that speed limits on tight 
curves need to be enforced technologically, not merely procedurally by the 
imposition of speed limits.

According to Prof. Roger Kemp of Lancaster University, quoted by MSN, the 
accident in Spain occurred on a section of ?half completed? track that was 
still being brought up to date with the safety standards of the European 
Rail Traffic Management System, which would have prevented the train from 
exceeding the speed on the section of track. 
http://news.uk.msn.com/world/why-spains-horror-train-crash-cant-happen-in-the-uk569032

If this is true, the driver should not be the only one under 
investigation.

Chris Dale
(also speaking for himself only)

From: systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de 
[mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf Of 
peter.sheppard at uk.transport.bombardier.com
Sent: 29 July 2013 13:35
To: systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Spanish train crash

I have just one comment - "Morpeth" 1969, 1984, 1994! 

Cheers 

Peter 
(Speaking on behalf of himself only) 

Peter Sheppard
Senior Safety Engineer and Validator

Mobile: +44 7920 247931

Please consider the environment before you print / Merci de penser à 
l'environnement avant d'imprimer / Bitte denken Sie an die Umwelt bevor 
Sie drucken 

Bombardier Transportation UK Ltd 
Registered Office: Litchurch Lane, Derby, DE24 8AD, England 
TEL +44 1332 344666, FAX +44 1332 266271 
Registered in England 
Registration No. 2235994 

"Chris Dale" <chris.dale at scsc.org.uk> 
Sent by: systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de 
29/07/2013 12:41 

To
<systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de> 
cc

Subject
Re: [SystemSafety] Spanish train crash

PBL wrote:

> 11. I read in the Observer (Sunday paper of the Guardian group) that the
driver
> has been arrested, arraigned in handcuffs before a judge, and charged 
with
> multiple manslaughter.
>
> That is, of course, an excellent way to ensure that investigators (of 
any
kind)
> obtain minimal useful information about any human factors at play in 
this
> accident. Indeed, the article reports that he has received legal advice
not to
> make a statement to police.

Hear, hear!

If some technological failure caused the accident, we need to know.

If some technology misled, confused or distracted the driver at a critical
moment, we need to know.

If some technology that should have intervened was absent, switched off, 
or
otherwise ineffective, we need to know.

The (seemingly) media-led frenzy to find someone to blame is an obstacle 
to
the prevention of future accidents. Even if the technology is not at 
fault,
we should still be asking what would lead an experienced, well-qualified
driver to act (or not act) in the way he did. Then we have a chance of
improving things. We won't if the 'blame game' takes priority.

Chris Dale
Safety-Critical Systems Club Meetings Co-ordinator

chris.dale at scsc.org.uk
Tel: +44 (0)1326 565758
Mobile: +44 (0)7904 056507
www.scsc.org.uk

Director
Dale Research Ltd
2 Reppersfield Row, Breage, Helston TR13 9PG
Registered in England and Wales no: 4937941

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