[SystemSafety] Logic

Nick Lusty nl887 at my.open.ac.uk
Wed Feb 19 13:38:36 CET 2014


Sad to say, this is a situation that I see time and time again, and it 
inevitably leads to problems in validating safety critical systems.  
Verification of the code to low level design through low level module 
testing providing MC/DC coverage is easy, but demonstrating that the 
system validly accurately meets the unformed user requirements is much 
harder. Using formal methods to create the requirements is one way of 
addressing this, as it leaves fewer corners for ambiguities to hide.  Z 
was used extensively for iFACTS, and on a couple of other projects I 
have worked on have used a variety of logic tables to specify 
requirements where possible.

Nick

On 19/02/2014 12:28, Michael J. Pont wrote:
>   The companies that I deal with
> produce systems ranging from aerospace systems to household appliances.
>
> In many cases (probably the majority of cases that I see), there is limited
> evidence of "process" or documentation available from the "embedded team"
> when I arrive at the company door.  Requirements documents are often*very*
> basic, if they exist at all.

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