[SystemSafety] Autonomous Vehicles and "Hacking" Threats

[Brent Kimberley]

How does Andy et al estimate the volume of undiscovered anomalies?

On Saturday, November 22, 2014 10:47 AM, Martyn Thomas <martyn at thomas-associates.co.uk> wrote:
  

  On 21/11/2014 16:38, Stefan Winter wrote:
  
I had hoped for some better estimate of defect densities for the latter. The best approximation I had come up with so far is the product of "lines of code in a modern car" (100 million for a premium car in 2009) and "defect count per line of code in really critical software" (10^-4). I had taken these numbers from an IEEE spectrum publication and a short paper from Gerard Holzmann, hoping that critical NASA software contains in average less bugs than common automotive code and the calculation, hence, gives me a conservative estimate. If anyone has a better idea or wants to share more accurate numbers,  please let me know. :-) 
 
 Andy German's Crosstalk article (http://www.crosstalkonline.org/storage/issue-archives/2003/200311/200311-0-Issue.pdf) decribed the analysis of a range of software in a military aircraft. He reported a range of "anomaly" densities, ranging from 4/KLoC to 250/KLoC.
 
 Martyn
 
 
  
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