[SystemSafety] Degraded software performance [diverged from Fault, Failure and Reliability Again]

Wed Mar 4 21:49:15 CET 2015

So Nick,

Using your logic the probability of the failure of a hardware component due
to fatigue will also be zero (it wasn't triggered because there were
insufficient cycles) or one (it was triggered and will always fail).? And
yet we talk about the reliability of such components?

:)

On Thu, Mar 5, 2015 at 5:23 AM, Nick Tudor <njt at tudorassoc.com> wrote:

> Hi Drew
>
> This is thread is getting hard to follow- let alone on a phone on a train
> in the middle of rural England so I apologise if I misinterpreted some of
> your intent. You can now tick off 'apology '[image: 😀]
>
> You make some good points but the nub of this argument is whether one can
> attribute a reliability to software as a component in a system and if so
> how?  I and others have yet to see any argument to support this belief.
>
> To follow on from that and to address one of your points, if it is stated
> that  inputs affect the outputs I would of course agree. What the effect is
> will be entirely deterministic and have no random element; at least this is
> what I learned at school. The probability of an error in the software
> causing a system fault is therefore either zero (it wasn't triggered by the
> inputs) or one (it was triggered and will ALWAYS do the same thing with the
> same inputs).
>
> Cheers
>
> On Wednesday, 4 March 2015, DREW Rae <d.rae at griffith.edu.au> wrote:
>
>> Nick,
>> I think you've reversed the point I was making, and then disagreed with
>> the opposite of what I was saying. What I really should have done is used
>> "computer system reliability" and refused to buy into the hardware/software
>> demarkation issue.
>>
>> I disagree with claiming software rates for software regardless of
>> whether they are carefully concocted statistical estimates, or "software
>> doesn't fail". BOTH rely on making some arbitrary distinction between what
>> is software, and what is hardware. Whoever makes that distinction,
>> where-ever they make it, has an obligation to state clear assumptions about
>> the other side of the distinction, and have grounds for believing those
>> assumptions to be realistic.
>>
>> You want to say that each of my failure modes for software "is a hardware
>> issue". Fine. But you don't want to make claims for software reliability
>> either. If you're not going to make a claim for reliability, any
>> distinction between software and hardware you want to create is fine by me.
>> Anyone who wants to claim either hardware or software reliability though,
>> and also wants to make a distinction between "software issues" and
>> "hardware issues", needs to consider both sides of the distinction.
>>
>> If someone wants to say "the processor that the software runs on is not
>> software", then their standard needs to specifically address how they'll
>> make sure that your software requirements consider the aging of the
>> processor. If they want to say that changes in the input profile for the
>> software are not a software issue, then they need to go back to software
>> engineering school, because there's no universe in which a changed pattern
>> of inputs does not change the probability of an incorrect output.
>>
>> On the plus side, if you'll let me characterise your message as a
>> strawman (instead of an honest misinterpretation of intent, which I'm sure
>> it was) I can complete my mailing list fallacy bingo card. We've already
>> had arguments from antiquity, argument from authority, "is" equals "ought",
>> equivocation, false equivalence, and not understanding the difference
>> between false and falsifiable. I don't think we've had anyone blatantly
>> misrepresent anyone else's position though.
>>
>> Drew
>>
>> My safety podcast: disastercast.co.uk
>> My mobile (from October 6th): 0450 161 361
>>
>> On 4 March 2015 at 16:25, Nick Tudor <njt at tudorassoc.com> wrote:
>>
>>> In line responses Andrew:
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, 4 March 2015, DREW Rae <d.rae at griffith.edu.au> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Michael,
>>>> I need to give more than one example, because the point is general,
>>>> rather than specific to the individual causes. In each case the cumulative
>>>> probability of software failure increases over time.
>>>>
>>>
>>> >>if you can determine the wear out mechanism for software I would
>>> agree, but you can't, so I don't.
>>>
>>> 1) Damage to the instruction set
>>>> e.g. the physical record of the instructions on a storage medium changes
>>>> very specific e.g. bit flip on a magnetic storage device holding the
>>>> executable files
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> >>this is a hardware issue.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> 2) Increased unreliability of the physical execution environment
>>>> e.g. an increased rate of processor errors
>>>> very specific e.g. dust accumulates on part of the processor card,
>>>> making it run hot and produce calculation errors
>>>> >> this too is hardware.
>>>> 3) Increased unreliability of input hardware
>>>> e.g. software is required to detect and respond correctly to an
>>>> increased rate and variety of sensor failure combinations
>>>> Note: This is the one that challenges "but we're running the software
>>>> in exactly the same hardware environment". Hardware environments change as
>>>> they get older.
>>>>
>>>> >>ditto
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> 4) Software accumulates information during runtime
>>>> e.g. a count of elapsed time
>>>> e.g. increasing volume of stored data
>>>> e.g. memory leak
>>>> >>bad requirements or/and bad verification.
>>>> NB1: In all of these cases I've heard arguments "that's not the
>>>> software, that's X". Those arguments are only relevant if you can control
>>>> for X when collecting data for software reliability calculation. Software
>>>> without an execution environment is a design. It "never fails" in the way
>>>> that _no_ design fails. When it does fail, it is subject to the same
>>>> degredation over time as any physical implementation
>>>>
>>>
>>> >> there is no such thing as software reliability so don't use maths (or
>>> rather statistics and claim they are maths) inappropriately.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> NB2: I'm not claiming that failure due to physical degredation is
>>>> significant compared to failure due to errors in the original instructions.
>>>> I'm saying that we don't know, and that not knowing becomes a big issue
>>>> once we've tested to the point of not finding errors in the original
>>>> instructions. At that point, absent evidence to the contrary, we should be
>>>> assuming that physical degredation is signficant.
>>>>
>>>> >>. No one (I hope) denies that hardware effects may influence software
>>>> calculations. Still doesn't mean that the maths, er Statistics are the
>>>> right tool for the job.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Drew
>>>>
>>>> On 4 March 2015 at 12:27, Michael J. Pont <M.Pont at safetty.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Drew,
>>>>>
>>>>> “The underlying point holds, that software _can_ exhibit degraded
>>>>> performance over time.”
>>>>>
>>>>> Can you please give me a simple example of what you mean by this.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael.
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> The System Safety Mailing List
>>>>> systemsafety at TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Nick Tudor
>>> Tudor Associates Ltd
>>> Mobile: +44(0)7412 074654
>>> www.tudorassoc.com
>>>
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>>>
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>>> <http://www.aeronautique-associates.com>*
>>>
>>>
>>
>
> --
> Nick Tudor
> Tudor Associates Ltd
> Mobile: +44(0)7412 074654
> www.tudorassoc.com
>
> *77 Barnards Green Road*
> *Malvern*
> *Worcestershire*
> *WR14 3LR*
> *Company No. 07642673*
> *VAT No:116495996*
>
> *www.aeronautique-associates.com <http://www.aeronautique-associates.com>*
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> The System Safety Mailing List
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>
>

-- 
*Matthew Squair*
MIEAust CPEng

Mob: +61 488770655
Email: MattSquair at gmail.com
Website: www.criticaluncertainties.com <http://criticaluncertainties.com/>
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