[SystemSafety] COTS display certification

Matthew Squair mattsquair at gmail.com
Wed Jul 27 02:24:38 CEST 2016


I've always been a bit fuzzy about the next step though. 

If we decide that software will implement this function then the software development processes must satisfy the allocated integrity level. 

From a code/data duality perspective I implement a function in software as a mix of data and code. But I can use varying ratios of the two. Logically any integrity processes need to cover both the code and data 'parts' because it's both that are satisfying the functional requirement. 

But how does one argue equivalence between integrity processes for code and data? At the aggregate level surely you must be making that argument? And that such integrity is independent of potentially varying ratios of the two in any solution? 

Matthew Squair

MIEAust, CPEng
Mob: +61 488770655
Email; Mattsquair at gmail.com
Web: http://criticaluncertainties.com

> On 27 Jul 2016, at 3:21 AM, Peter Bernard Ladkin <ladkin at rvs.uni-bielefeld.de> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On 2016-07-26 18:33 , jean-louis Boulanger wrote:
>> In new OCC system, some vital information are displayed on control screen and this informations is
>> SIL x or DAL x.
> 
> Sorry, such a statement is a category mistake.
> 
> In IEC 61508, safety *functions* get SILs. Information is not a function, therefore information
> cannot get a SIL.
> 
> PBL
> 
> Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bielefeld, Germany
> MoreInCommon
> Je suis Charlie
> Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319  www.rvs-bi.de
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> The System Safety Mailing List
> systemsafety at TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <https://lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de/mailman/private/systemsafety/attachments/20160727/13d5eb9a/attachment.html>


More information about the systemsafety mailing list