[SystemSafety] Validating AI driven systems

Les Chambers les at chambers.com.au
Tue Apr 18 01:21:11 CEST 2017


The advent of AI driven safety critical systems is about to render obsolete
all engineering processes we currently apply to validating trusted systems.

 

The problem is well covered in Will Knight's insightfull article: The Dark
Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT Technology review.

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai
/

 

Knight's problem statement is as follows:

"... it isn't completely clear how the car makes its decisions. Information
from the vehicle's sensors goes straight into a huge network of artificial
neurons that process the data and then deliver the commands required to
operate the steering wheel, the brakes, and other systems. The result seems
to match the responses you'd expect from a human driver. But what if one day
it did something unexpected-crashed into a tree, or sat at a green light? As
things stand now, it might be difficult to find out why. The system is so
complicated that even the engineers who designed it may struggle to isolate
the reason for any single action. And you can't ask it: there is no obvious
way to design such a system so that it could always explain why it did what
it did."

 

So here we have a new "ility": explainability  ... validate that!

 

Up to now the core principle of validation (and a prime indicator of
integrity) is predictibility - a system's observable behaviour and
nonfunctional properties must comply with its specification. But what if the
specification says, "Think for yourself."

 

Researchers are working on it. Knight describes the murky world of AI
thinking discovered by AI experts who attempt to probe a neural net's
thought processes. Their discoveries are flat out creepy and of no material
assistance to a V&V engineer tasked with validating a system in the here and
now - which leads me to believe that not much validation is actually going
on in the AI application domain. We get glimpses of this every now and then.
For example, the system that processed parole applications that was found to
be discriminating against black men. It turns out that its "deep learning"
was from a community of racists.

 

The only solution I can offer is 85 years old, from Lord Moulton, an English
judge. His view was that human action can be divided into three domains. At
one end is the law at the other is free choice and between them is the realm
of manners. In this realm Lord Moulton said, "lies a domain in which our
actions are not determined by law but in which we are not free to behave in
any way we choose. In this domain we act with greater or lesser freedom from
constraint, on a continuum that extends from a consciousness of duty through
a sense of what is required by public spirit, to good form appropriate in a
given situation".

 

Projecting onto systems development we have the monitor program that
enforces a set of simple rules on system behaviour. In chemical processing
we called it "abort programming". When a production plant got to an unsafe
state the abort program would shut it down. The abort program was written by
an engineer highly experienced in the process technology. The abort
programming team was totally separate from the control system development
team. All this programming was done in the realm of the law. The law being,
"Thou shall not hurt anyone or destroy equipment."

 

System monitors can be validated. All we have to decide is where we draw the
red (shut down) lines, in the realm of manners or law. At least this is my
humble opinion. Wiser heads may have other ideas.

 

Thoughts anyone?

 

Les

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-------------------------------------------------
Les Chambers
Director
Chambers & Associates Pty Ltd
 <http://www.chambers.com.au> www.chambers.com.au

Blog:  <http://www.systemsengineeringblog.com/>
www.systemsengineeringblog.com

Twitter:  <http://www.twitter.com/chambersles> @ChambersLes
M: 0412 648 992
Intl M: +61 412 648 992
Ph: +61 7 3870 4199
Fax: +61 7 3870 4220
 <mailto:les at chambers.com.au> les at chambers.com.au
-------------------------------------------------

 

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