[SystemSafety] Collected stopgap measures

[Peter Bishop]

On 04/11/2018 07:44, Andrew Banks wrote:
>>> Linux (and lots of other FOSS) is used in critical systems - even 
>>> safety-critical systems.
> Just because it is, doesn't mean it should
>
> I would love to see the safety case of anything running on Linux - or WinCE
> for that matter...
I think that takes too narrow a view.

The safety case is for the /s//ystem/ as a whole, and an important part
of assuring safety is the /architecture/ of the system rather than
individual components.

The architecture should seek to minimise the safety impact of individual
component failures . For example, common design paradigms where
"fail-silent" is safe are:

- primary system + safety monitor,

- cross-checking pair doing the same job but with diverse software and
hardware components (the pre-cooked bits)

Peter Bishop, Adelard

>
> A
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Peter Bishop
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