[SystemSafety] Critical systems Linux

[Matthew Squair]

Hi Peter, could you expand on your last point please? 

Matthew Squair

MIEAust, CPEng
Mob: +61 488770655
Email; Mattsquair at gmail.com
Web: http://criticaluncertainties.com

> On 21 Nov 2018, at 7:20 am, Peter Bernard Ladkin <ladkin at causalis.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On 2018-11-20 18:40 , Chris Hills wrote:
>> 
>> And the question I asked: why do it at all when there are plenty of other
>> POSIX Compliant RTOS and OS out there that have full Safety Certification to
>> 61508 SIL3 and  Do178  etc.?
> Just to be clear on one thing.
> 
> There is no such thing as "full Safety Certification" to IEC 61508 SIL 3. Or "certification" to IEC
> 61508 SIL anything. Although some organisations will write you certificates to say something looking
> very much like this if you don't inquire too closely.
> 
> If you are talking software, then with SSILs you are talking "systematic capability", and this is
> dependent upon the specific task the software-based safety function is performing in the specific
> system for which it is written.
> 
> Civil aerospace regulations, on the other hand, can and do bestow general "appropriateness"
> categories on general-purpose SW.
> 
> PBL
> 
> Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bielefeld, Germany
> MoreInCommon
> Je suis Charlie
> Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319  www.rvs-bi.de
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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