[SystemSafety] MH370

[Mike Ellims]

Wouldn't it be simpler/easier to change the in-flight tracking (i.e.
positional information) so that it couldn't be turned off while the aircraft
is in the air and perhaps provide some separate electric backup?

Off the cuff I can't see a good reason why the pilot should be allowed to
make an aircraft disappear and several good ones why they should not.

 

Cheers.

 

From: systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
[mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf Of
Matthew Squair
Sent: 11 March 2014 09:50
To: safetyyork at phaedsys.com
Cc: systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] MH370

 

Yep, like an EPIRB. But if you're going to do that, well memory is cheap.


Matthew Squair

 

MIEAust, CPEng

Mob: +61 488770655

Email; Mattsquair at gmail.com

Web: http://criticaluncertainties.com


On 11 Mar 2014, at 8:13 pm, Chris Hills <safetyyork at phaedsys.com> wrote:

Actually you don't need a detachable FDR or CVR.  All you need is a
detachable simple distress beacon with a life of 48 hours. If you can find
that it would narrow the search field to say, a 10 mile radius,   rather
than thousands of square miles.  Then you can find the wreckage and the
black boxes far faster.

 

A small distress beacon would be smaller in size, mass and complexity, very
cheap (comparatively) and easier to mount. 

 

Regards

   Chris 

 

 

From: systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
[mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf Of
Matthew Squair
Sent: 10 March 2014 23:28
To: Peter Bernard Ladkin
Cc: systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] MH370

 

Sure, but over the years there have also been a number of lost at sea
accidents where either the FDR or CVR were not recovered or were recovered
damaged. Dave Warren's original proposal was aimed squarely at that problem
and was for a foam cored blister pack with a simple wire spool recorder and
die pack, the concept being that it would be mounted on the external
fuselage (around the tail) and popped off in an explosion or impact induced
hull over-pressure.

 

On Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Peter Bernard Ladkin
<ladkin at rvs.uni-bielefeld.de> wrote:


> On 10 Mar 2014, at 22:17, Matthew Squair <mattsquair at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Absolutely, nothing is perfect. But would I prefer an alternate to months
of trawling the abyssal plain with a side scanning sonar? You betcha.
Especially if it's a very, very cheap alternative.

In the last twenty years, there are just two cases of lost-at-sea I can
think of in which evidence from the hull was *not* required in addition to
FDR data to determine cause. There are five cases in which in-air
disintegration or burning, which are not identifiable from FDR data,
initiated the hull loss, and there is one further case in which physical
evidence was required to show there was no anomaly (that it was, in effect,
murder/suicide). Two against six isn't a persuasive ratio.

I can go through the records to make this definitive rather than "I can
think of", if necessary.

The result of a cost-benefit analysis, even for the past, let alone for
conceivable future cases, is not at all evident to me.

PBL


Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, University of Bielefeld and Causalis Limited





 

-- 

Matthew Squair

MIEAust CPEng

 

Mob: +61 488770655

Email: MattSquair at gmail.com

Website: www.criticaluncertainties.com <http://criticaluncertainties.com/> 

 

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