[SystemSafety] Another unbelievable failure (file system overflow)

[Matthew Squair]

Martyn,

As I understand the UK HSE regulatory environment then yes in the UK
context they are equivalent, by virtue of the HSE's guidance that you
quote. However the Australian legislations definition of what is SFAIRP is
quite different. Different jurisdictions have differing approaches I guess.

In terms of the Australian Model WHS Act 2011, hereafter known as the Act,
risk is relegated to being but one element of assessing gross
disproportion. In ALARP (i.e the carrot diagram we all know and love) in
contrast risk is still used as the primary measure of effect. That's what
the 'L' relates to after all.  :)

There are a number of organisations (and regulators) in Australia who do
currently use the ALARP principle, what I've found is that if you want to
retain the ALARP process to be compliant to the Act you have to add a layer
of additional process around the central ALARP carrot to meet the
reasonable practical criteria. For example if you are in the acceptable
ALARP zone and there are additional things you could reasonably do, then
you need to do them. At which point you might reasonably ask why retain the
ALARP risk 'process' when risk is no longer the central criteria?

As I see it the Act is aimed at articulating what 'reasonably practical' in
the law means for WHS so that it can be enforced. The focus is very much on
ensuring what can be done is done rather than evaluation of a risk
criteria. The result is of course a precautionary design outcome.

As a side note the Act also allows for scenarios where there is no risk
assessment conducted. This is for hazards that are so well understood that
there is an established and accepted solution that is deemed to be SFAIRP,
for example there is a regulation or code of practice. To my mind this is a
good thing as it reflects reality, but once again it reduces the relevance
of risk as a decision criteria under the act.

I think that defining a due process in the legislation as the Act does is
something of a first, and I'm pretty sure it's going to have lots of
unintended consequences. Interesting days ahead.

Matthew Squair

MIEAust, CPEng
Mob: +61 488770655
Email; Mattsquair at gmail.com
Web: http://criticaluncertainties.com

On 6 Jun 2015, at 1:43 am, Martyn Thomas <martyn at thomas-associates.co.uk>
wrote:

Matthew

HSE regard ALARP and SFARP as equivalent. See below:

"You may come across it as SFAIRP (“so far as is reasonably
practicable”) or ALARP (“as low as reasonably practicable”). SFAIRP is
the term most often used in the Health and Safety at Work etc Act and in
Regulations. ALARP is the term used by risk specialists, and
duty-holders are more likely to know it. We use ALARP in this guidance.
In HSE’s view, the two terms are interchangeable except if you are
drafting formal legal documents when you must use the correct legal
phrase."  http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpglance.htm

In practice, if the risk is sufficiently low to be considered
"tolerable" then failure to carry out further reduction (even if
reasonably practicable) is unlikely to lead to successful prosecution.
(For the avoidance of doubt, let me say that this is my personal
opinion. I'm a Director of HSE but here writing only in a personal
capacity not on behalf of HSE. If you have a strong reason to need a
formal policy position from HSE, I can probably get it).

Regards

Martyn


On 05/06/2015 06:09, Matthew Squair wrote:

the So Far As Is Reasonably Practical (SFAIRP) principle for deciding

when to stop, and no this is not the same as the ALARP principle of

the HSE.



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