[SystemSafety] a public beta phase ???
les at chambers.com.au
Thu Aug 11 21:56:17 CEST 2016
I think we're talking about emergent properties here. The ones that manifest when you integrate two highly complex systems– Man made automation and man. Sloth is a common one. It manifests at several levels: inattention at the controls, dumbing down of training ... As evidenced by many conversations on this list , engineers pay scant attention to this important issue. Mainly because we receive no education in the matter. You become what you focus on and there is currently no focus. As we approach this world of augmented reality I think we at least need the book of bad behaviours. Followed by a test.
> On 12 Aug 2016, at 2:37 AM, Smith, Brian E. (ARC-TH) <brian.e.smith at nasa.gov> wrote:
> Indeed, Peter. Improbable, but not impossible. The fact that these
> events have happened at all may create sufficient pushback against
> single-pilot operations. Adopting a single-pilot paradigm for even cargo
> operations will dramatical increase exposure to such rogue-pilot threats.
> There¹s a reason that another crew member must be present in the cockpit
> when one of the pilots takes a bio-break.
> On 8/11/16, 9:30 AM, "systemsafety on behalf of Peter Bernard Ladkin"
> <systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de on behalf of
> ladkin at causalis.com> wrote:
>>> On 2016-08-11 18:10 , Smith, Brian E. (ARC-TH) wrote:
>>> .... the possibility of a rogue
>>> pilot (an insider) would still exist. While such circumstances are
>>> highly improbable,
>> It happened once in 2013 (LAM, Namibia), maybe once in 2014 (Malaysian,
>> Indian Ocean) and once in
>> 2015 (Germanwings, S. France) on scheduled passenger flights. It's
>> happened before (Royal Air Maroc,
>> 1994; SilkAir, 1997; Egyptair, 1999).
>> Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bielefeld, Germany
>> Je suis Charlie
>> Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319 www.rvs-bi.de
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