[SystemSafety] The Intertwining of Safety and Security

Martyn Thomas martyn at thomas-associates.co.uk
Mon Nov 7 15:30:25 CET 2016


Yes, it's clear that if an intruder can cause your safety function to be
invoked more often than it was assumed in the safety argument that it
/would/ be invoked, then the safety argument is likely to be invalid.

Martyn

On 07/11/2016 11:24, Peter Bernard Ladkin wrote:
> A very hot topic nowadays. But I encounter a lot of people who think you can actually handle syste
> safety and system security in IACS systems separately. I encounter others who think that ensuring
> safety means you need to make sure your safety functions are not compromised.
>
> Not so. Your safety functions may be perfect, remain uncompromised, and still be insufficient to
> inhibit an unacceptable risk due to intruder activity. The argument is straightforward.
>
> https://abnormaldistribution.org/index.php/2016/11/07/an-observation-on-the-intertwining-of-safety-and-security/
>
> PBL
>
> Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bielefeld, Germany
> MoreInCommon
> Je suis Charlie
> Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319  www.rvs-bi.de
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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> systemsafety at TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE


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