[SystemSafety] Partly Off Topic: What Happens in October [No Classification]

[Peter Bernard Ladkin]

On 2016-10-18 13:11 , Barnes, Robert A (NNPPI) wrote:
> This is quite a specific example and I'd argue that, if the security case rests on a single point of 
> failure in non-assured software, something has gone horribly wrong in the design and development of this 
> system!

Well, sure. I'm sure Apple would agree. That observed, what's the answer to my question?

Supply chain assurance is one of the three biggies in HMG's cybersecurity program, according to the
Chief Scientific Advisor, Anthony Finkelstein (the other two are physics of computation, and
behavioural science). Part of that - most of that - is ensuring you don't assure inadequate SW.

The reality in IACS is more like what was described for NPPs in last October's Chatham House report
which I referenced earlier this year.

> Defence in depth has become an accepted principle in safety engineering, and it is just as valid in 
> security.  

And it's been a overt principle of NPPs since the beginning. It still doesn't hinder situations such
as described in the Chatham House report.

PBL

Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bielefeld, Germany
MoreInCommon
Je suis Charlie
Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319  www.rvs-bi.de





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