[SystemSafety] Is risk engineering an art?

Les Chambers les at chambers.com.au
Mon Aug 14 06:27:01 CEST 2017


Daniel

There is an old saying regarding creative output, "if I could explain it to you it wouldn't be art." I have seen this play out in some risk identification scenarios. Always in the company of highly experienced people. For example, head office engineers didn't think exposing motorists to a variable speed limit sign that was cycling through several different speed limits within five seconds was particularly risky. But when we got to testing and commissioning the signs on a freeway the local operations people said, "No way are we going to do that!" They couldn't explain why in so many words. The answer was just no. You could say that the response was more emotional than technical, but we trusted their judgement and put a sugar bag over the sign when we cycled it through its possible speed limit values. This kind of intuition approaches the artistic. It's a good thing but hard to transfer because it depends on individual experience.

In the best of all worlds we would have a universal hazard log for various application domains; rail, aviation, chemical processing ... it would be a very useful Ph.D. dissertation for any academics lurking with nothing to do. Much like NASA's design review checklist here: http://www.chambers.com.au/public_resources/Design-review-NASA-CR-2014-218504.pdf

Risk assessment would then lean more toward an engineering discipline than an art.

I suspect though that we'll always get along with a bit of both. 

Cheers

Les

PS: regarding the recent discussion on the definition (re-definition) of risk, I've always been partial to the probability and severity version. In general, a definition that supports the decision to act is a good thing. This definition motivates people to take action to reduce risk. No one really believes that their house is going to burn down but we buy insurance anyway - the consequences for the uninsured are just too dire. The newer definitions seem terribly fuzzy. One is likely to spend all one's emotional energy trying to figure out what they mean as opposed to acting on what is in front of one. One wonders what motivates these standards writing people to fix things that work so well. I had cause to study the latest version of ISO 9001 (2015) this month. The deckchairs have been rearranged and the whole thing made weaker – there is no explicit requirement for a quality representative. Could we not corral these standards reorganizers and focus them on something more useful: creating the one and universal hazard log for instance?

 

 

From: Les Chambers [mailto:les at chambers.com.au] 
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2017 2:22 PM
To: 'Daniel Grivicic'; 'systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de'
Subject: RE: [SystemSafety] Is risk engineering an art?

 

Daniel

There is an old saying regarding creative output, "if I could explain it to you it wouldn't be art." I have seen this play out in some risk identification scenarios. Always in the company of highly experienced people. For example, head office engineers didn't think exposing motorists to a variable speed limit sign that was cycling through several different speed limits within five seconds was particularly risky. But when we got to testing and commissioning the signs on a freeway the local operations people said, "No way are we going to do that!" They couldn't explain why in so many words. The answer was just no. You could say that the response was more emotional than technical, but we trusted their judgement and put a sugar bag over the sign when we cycled it through its possible speed limit values. This kind of intuition approaches the artistic. It's a good thing but hard to transfer because it depends on individual experience.

In the best of all worlds we would have a universal hazard log for various application domains; rail, aviation, chemical processing ... it would be a very useful Ph.D. dissertation for any academics lurking with nothing to do. Much like NASA's design review checklist here: http://www.chambers.com.au/public_resources/Design-review-NASA-CR-2014-218504.pdf

Risk assessment would lean more toward engineering discipline than art.

I suspect though that we'll always get along with a bit of both. 

Cheers

Les

PS: regarding the recent discussion on the definition (re-definition) of risk, I've always been partial to the probability and severity version. In general, a definition that supports the decision to act is a good thing. This definition motivates people to take action to reduce risk. No one really believes that their house is going to burn down but we buy insurance anyway - the consequences for the uninsured are just too dire. The newer definitions seem terribly fuzzy. One is likely to spend all one's emotional energy trying to figure out what they mean as opposed to acting on what is in front of one. One wonders what motivates these standards people to fix things that work so well. I had cause to study the latest version of ISO 9001 (2015) this month. The deckchairs have been rearranged and the whole thing made weaker – there is no explicit requirement for a quality representative. Could we not corral these standards reorganizers and focus them on something more useful: creating the one and universal hazard log?

 

From: systemsafety [mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf Of Daniel Grivicic
Sent: Monday, August 14, 2017 10:32 AM
To: systemsafety at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de
Subject: [SystemSafety] Is risk engineering an art?

 

Hello everyone,

 

In some current readings I have seen the term 'art' being used when discussing the application of safety ideas.

 

Is risk engineering an art or is it fair to consider it an art in particular circumstances? What would these circumstances be?

 

Any input is appreciated.

 

Daniel. 

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