[SystemSafety] Australian System Safety Conference 2018, May 23 to 25, Melbourne

[Fredrik Asplund]

Sorry Les, I seem to have fallen into the trap of reasoning from the (incomplete) perspective of my own interests. To my defense it was an offhand comment, since I was really just trying to understand Peter's reasoning. You are right that there are more direct parts of "safety culture". I find Guldenmund's paper from 2000 a good reference, in which he refers to three layers - artefacts, attitudes and basic assumptions. The parts of "safety culture" that I find most interesting are those relating to basic assumptions and (to some extent) attitudes, which indirectly affects artefacts (hence my comment). This does not mean that I (as some argue) believe that you cannot change safety culture, or that it isn't worth the effort it would require. I fully agree it is an important issue, especially the more "unmeasurable" parts of it.

On a side note, although I didn't understand this particular comment I actually usually find Peter refreshingly exact in his texts. This does not mean I always agree with him, but still, as my own comment shows, it is too easy to think everyone will have the some background/perspective as yourself. However, if there is something that at times makes me feel like unsubscribing from this list and definitely makes me less interested in commenting on it, then it is this sniping at each other that you and Peter get into (yes, I read Peter's reply to this email). I would expect an email list to be to the benefit of understanding each other's perspectives, not to try to "win" by bashing each other in the head with one-sided arguments and insults.

Sincerely,
/ Fredrik

-----Original Message-----
From: Les Chambers [mailto:les at chambers.com.au] 
Sent: den 9 december 2017 00:41
To: Fredrik Asplund
Cc: Peter Bernard Ladkin; The System Safety List
Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Australian System Safety Conference 2018, May 23 to 25, Melbourne

Peter and Fredrik
Given that culture is often defined as a shared belief system I disagree that it's affect is indirect. The whole purpose of developing a safety culture is to directly influence peoples activities at the coalface on a day to day basis. 
An actor imbued with a strong safety related belief system will not walk past a safety hazard and is physically incapable of committing an unsafe act.
As for Peters prose I share your confusion. 
Peter, imagine yourself using those words in front of a room full of operators – aircraft operators, plant operators, practical people who need specific guidance and motivation. The thing I love about these people is they are smart , dependable and Armed with finely tuned BS sniffers. Being around them keeps you grounded, it's good for the soul. So my advice to you is forget about academic seminars. Spend more time in control rooms and cockpits. You might learn something.

Les


> On 8 Dec 2017, at 8:59 pm, Fredrik Asplund <fasplund at kth.se> wrote:
> 
> Given that influence by culture is always indirect I am not sure that definition of "depends" is very useful in the context, but sure - then I understand what you mean.
> Sincerely,
> / Fredrik
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: systemsafety 
> [mailto:systemsafety-bounces at lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de] On Behalf 
> Of Peter Bernard Ladkin
> Sent: den 8 december 2017 10:31
> To: The System Safety List
> Subject: Re: [SystemSafety] Australian System Safety Conference 2018, 
> May 23 to 25, Melbourne
> 
> On 2017-12-08 10:08 , Fredrik Asplund wrote:
>>> Whether the braking system on my bicycle is dependable is prima facie a technical engineering.
>>> issue. It has two aspects: (a) whether the design and implementation 
>>> of the system makes it effective and highly reliable; (b) whether I maintain it appropriately.
>>> (a) is not at all cultural.
>> 
>> I am probably misunderstanding some part of the argument. How is (a) not dependent on the culture of the bike manufacturer?
> 
> The same way in which the correct proof of Fermat's Last Theorem is not dependent upon the psychology of Andrew Wiles and Richard Taylor and the culture which nourishes them and which enables them to think about it to the exclusion of almost anything else for many hours per day.
> 
> The same way in which the five-sigma evidence of the existence of the Higgs boson is not dependent upon the organisational culture of CERN.
> 
> Whether it exists is dependent on cultural factors. When it exists, its properties (for my bicycle brakes, physical; for the proof, mathematical and logical; for the evidence, statistical) are not necessarily dependent on any cultural factors at all.
> 
> PBL
> 
> Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bielefeld, Germany MoreInCommon Je suis 
> Charlie
> Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319  www.rvs-bi.de
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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