[SystemSafety] Collected stopgap measures

Olwen Morgan olwen at phaedsys.com
Sat Nov 3 22:44:05 CET 2018


Standardisation in this area is, IMO, irredeemably broken.


Olwen


On 03/11/2018 18:52, Martyn Thomas wrote:
>
> Unfortunately, IES 61508 isn't fit for purpose in a world with far 
> more software than hardware and a large and growing cybersecurity 
> threat. It was a decent standard for the 1980s, when almost nothing 
> else existed.
>
> It can't be fixed because the standardisation process is broken: 
> dominated by industry (because few others can afford to participate 
> fully - or get compensated for the mind-numbing tedium of endless 
> meetings with opposition from people with a different agenda). 
> Industry is good at standardising plugs and sockets, but useless at 
> setting aside commercial interests in the public good.  Which is why 
> 61508 is illogical, unscientific, and irredeemable. Public good 
> standards should be written by independent experts, throwing down the 
> gauntlet to industry to decide whether or not to follow the standard.
>
> Martyn
>
>
> On 03/11/2018 10:13, Paul Sherwood wrote:
>>> Developing SW according to IEC 61508-3:2010 will involve you in almost
>>> 60 documentation
>>> requirements. You will have to produce those 60 documents. About a
>>
>> Only if we believe that the IEC spells and incantations are fit for 
>> their purpose. Perhaps following them blindly will be enough to help 
>> defend in court in the event of accident. Or perhaps not.
>>
>> In the security world, Geer's Law is often cited: "Any security 
>> technology whose effectiveness can't be empirically determined is 
>> indistinguishable from blind luck."
>>
>> I fear that in the safety world, there's not enough transparency to 
>> establish what has been luck and what is effective. 
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> The System Safety Mailing List
> systemsafety at TechFak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE
> Manage your subscription: https://lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de/mailman/listinfo/systemsafety
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <https://lists.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de/mailman/private/systemsafety/attachments/20181103/f9852aa6/attachment.html>


More information about the systemsafety mailing list