[SystemSafety] Autopilot interface?

[Matthew Squair]

A checklist you say?

You mean something like this?

https://criticaluncertainties.com/hmi-requirements-completeness-checklists-v1-2/ <https://criticaluncertainties.com/hmi-requirements-completeness-checklists-v1-2/>

With acknowledgements to Nancy Leveson for the original work.

> On 9 Nov 2018, at 6:54 am, Olwen Morgan <olwen at phaedsys.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> A simple case-in-point of poor cognitive design:
> A few months ago, I missed the Wrexham exit off the Chester bypass. Turns out that there was a good reason for that. Until the Wrexham exit, "Wrexham" is written in big white letters on the green background. At the Wrexham exit, it changes to smaller black letters on a white background, having been apparently demoted to a local destination rather than a key route point. This is a classic case of lousy cognitive design. The change of gestaltung makes your "thinking-fast" cognitive pathway miss the direction to Wrexham.
> 
> Presenting information on a display is not the same as making a clear gestalt of it. If poor or inconsistent gestaltung affects inanimate road signs, how much more is it likely to affect critical system HMIs? I've only ever seen one book on this that I'd recommend to the average working software engineer:
> 
> Johnson, J., Designing with the Mind in Mind: Simple Guide to Understanding User Interface Design Guidelines, Morgan Kaufmann, 2ed. Feb 2014, ISBN-13: 978-0124079144, ASIN: 0124079148
> 
> Johnson writes very well IMO. I read the book through at a single sitting. (From it you could quite easily abstract an anti-blunder checklist for HMI design - checklists again!) I'd also recommend a nice little monograph on using model-based and task-based design for interactive applications:
> 
> Paterno, F., Model-based Design and Evaluation of Interactive Applications, Springer-Verlag, 2013 (softcover reprint of 2000 edition), ISBN-10: 1852331550.
> In this one, the author formalises the sequential parts of HMI design in a formal notation based on LOTOS.
> 
> Olwen
> 
> PS: For some surreal reason, your post made me think of a bloke going to his GP complaining that he had an non-annunciated dependency ... the mind boggles ... :-) 
> 
> 
> On 08/11/2018 18:34, Peter Bernard Ladkin wrote:
>> 
>> On 2018-11-08 17:53 , Olwen Morgan wrote:
>>> One should not, IMO, rely on training to compensate for a suboptimal HMI. I don't know enough about
>>> these systems to be able to say whether that has happened here but I tend to have a high index of
>>> suspicion in the matter.
>> I do know about these systems. I think your intuition is spot on.
>> 
>> There is an non-annunciated order dependency in the configuration. The flight crew configured the
>> system, but got something in the wrong order.
>> 
>> Had they paid attention to a small annunciation on the top right of the PFD, and asked themselves
>> why it was showing what it was showing, they would have discovered and corrected the AP state.
>> 
>> A similar situation occurred during an Air Inter flight into Strasbourg on 20 January 1992. Then,
>> with fatal consequences.
>> https://rvs-bi.de/publications/compendium/incidents_and_accidents/strasbourg_air_inter_a320.html <https://rvs-bi.de/publications/compendium/incidents_and_accidents/strasbourg_air_inter_a320.html>
>> 
>> Plus ca change ............
>> 
>> PBL
>> 
>> Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bielefeld, Germany
>> MoreInCommon
>> Je suis Charlie
>> Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319  www.rvs-bi.de <http://www.rvs-bi.de/>
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
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