[SystemSafety] Critical systems Linux

[Peter Bernard Ladkin]

As I observed before, this discussion seems to be taking place in a parallel universe.

Who is doing such "certifying", for what uses, and what does the "certificate" say?

PBL

On 2018-11-20 22:49 , Matthew Squair wrote:
> As I recall Martin Luther had some strong words about this sort of thing. :)
> 
> Matthew Squair
> 
> MIEAust, CPEng
> Mob: +61 488770655
> Email; Mattsquair at gmail.com <mailto:Mattsquair at gmail.com>
> Web: http://criticaluncertainties.com
> 
> On 21 Nov 2018, at 8:36 am, Paul Sherwood <paul.sherwood at codethink.co.uk
> <mailto:paul.sherwood at codethink.co.uk>> wrote:
> 
>> On 2018-11-20 21:26, Chuck_Petras at selinc.com <mailto:Chuck_Petras at selinc.com> wrote:
>>>> I must have missed something. Are we talking here about certifying a
>>>> piece of software with no reference to its operational context and
>>>> safety requirements?
>>> Pretty much.
>>
>> I may be missing something too, but as i understand it there are established examples of software
>> (e.g. microkernels) being 'pre-certified' for safety (I think the expression used is "safety
>> element out of context") without reference to a specific context and safety requirements.
>>
>> It seems that vendors of products which have acquired this kind of blessing/paperwork are then in
>> a position to then suggest to customers that they need pre-blessed software to achieve safety.

Prof. Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bielefeld, Germany
MoreInCommon
Je suis Charlie
Tel+msg +49 (0)521 880 7319  www.rvs-bi.de





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