[SystemSafety] Critical systems Linux

Matthew Squair mattsquair at gmail.com
Tue Nov 20 22:49:17 CET 2018


As I recall Martin Luther had some strong words about this sort of thing. :)

Matthew Squair

MIEAust, CPEng
Mob: +61 488770655
Email; Mattsquair at gmail.com
Web: http://criticaluncertainties.com

> On 21 Nov 2018, at 8:36 am, Paul Sherwood <paul.sherwood at codethink.co.uk> wrote:
> 
> On 2018-11-20 21:26, Chuck_Petras at selinc.com wrote:
>>> I must have missed something. Are we talking here about certifying a
>>> piece of software with no reference to its operational context and
>>> safety requirements?
>> Pretty much.
> 
> I may be missing something too, but as i understand it there are established examples of software (e.g. microkernels) being 'pre-certified' for safety (I think the expression used is "safety element out of context") without reference to a specific context and safety requirements.
> 
> It seems that vendors of products which have acquired this kind of blessing/paperwork are then in a position to then suggest to customers that they need pre-blessed software to achieve safety.
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