[SystemSafety] "FAA chief '100% confident' of 737 MAX safety as flights to resume"

[Les Chambers]

Several posts on this subject have dealt with an aspect of trusted system design philosophy that’s 
worthy of further discussion. That is, should software be trusted to compensate for an inherently 
unstable airframe design? In the abstract, should we trust software to make any unstable real-
world system of any kind, stable, predictable and safe?
As a card-carrying stoic I offer that the no voters are about to be overrun by the reality of apps 
such as driverless cars where software failure will , with high probability , result in injury and 
death. 
Further, be advised that the yes voters have been operating for some time. As early as 1979 I 
worked on chemical reactor control projects where we eliminated whole premix unit operations 
(vessels , pipes and pumps) that were , up until that time,  deemed necessary to avoid explosive 
mixes in the final reactor system. Software intensive advanced adaptive control systems and tight 
monitoring was deemed to be acceptable and safe. We saved a lot of money.

I note that safe operation was achieved in the context of the strongest safety culture I have seen 
in 46 years in engineering. That culture took decades to develop. No engineer ever lost an 
argument with a salesman over safety.

I believe, and history demonstrates, that the biggest body counts come from systemic failures in 
safety culture. I therefore don’t care all that much about how smart or committed the 737 certifiers 
may be.  The big boarding lounge question is: what measures has Boeing taken to rediscover and 
reapply its safety culture? Is there any evidence out there?

Are they yet meditating with Marcus Arelious?
‘ if it is not right do not do it; if it is not true do not say it.’

Les

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Les Chambers
les at chambers.com.au
+61 (0)412 648 992